What may be last of the UK House of Commons Education and Skills Committee sessions investigating the demise of UKeU was held on 12 January 2005. First up in the hot seats this time were Sun Microsystems' Leslie Stretch, Vice President, Sun Microsystems UK Ltd, and David Beagle, Account Manager of UKeU project, Sun Microsystems Ltd. Following up were Sir Brian Fender, former Chairman, and Dr Adrian Lepper, Secretary to the Board, e-Learning Holding Company. Sir Brian is also former Chief Executive of the HEFCE. The key highlights for me of this part of the investigation are:
- Sun Microsystems claim that when Sir Anthony Cleaver and John Beaumont took over UKeU there was move from a strategic partnership to a simple supplier relationship; there was a contract change to a fixed price contract. They claim to have lost +++ financially because they received only GBP 7.1 million, losses which were unprecedented in the 20 year history of Sun Microsystems UK Ltd. As the supplier they declare they were not responsible for the design of the system, the specification of the system, or the requirements definition of the system. Sun would now have wished for a stronger role in the governance of the initiative.
- Sun still believes it's a billion dollar e-learning marketplace
- Sun believes the whole venture was not given enough time and enough money to succeed (GBP 60 million). They contend that there were no reference architectures for what the UKeU was trying to achieve and so the initiative was breaking new ground.
- Sun declare they had a working, scaleable e-learning platform which exceeded the initial design specification when the plug was pulled.
- Sun declare they are discussion with HEFCE in how to resurrect the UKeU platform (which has cost GBP 14 million). Sun contends that the platform still has substantial value and they would like to exploit it commercially. They claim the majority of the IPR on the platform.
- Sun contends a new platform was required because UK HE is not based on a simple content/information delivery model (Eds Note: Those of us working in e-learning are very gratified to hear this although we daily see much evidence of just such a simple content/information delivery model).
- Sun intended to profit from their relationship with UKeU by reimplementing the platform in new contexts in the global marketplace, i.e they would sell or license the system.
- Although there were plans to launch UKeU on the stock market Sun declare they did not perceive this as a major potential source of return on their investment. The Chairman and Chief Executive of UKeU, however, would have benefitted personally.
- Sir Brian Fender thinks a fair amount of responsibility for UKeU falls on his shoulders and appears to be prepared to accept the blame if any is aportioned.
- The intial focus on the overseas market was a strategy intended to overcome the difficulties of expecting UK universities to collaborate with a UK e-University whilst also competing within the local UK market.
- UKeU arose from a successful bid to the 2000 Spending Round. There was no direct communication with the then Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett or the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Sir Brian Fender then Chief Executive of the Higher Education Funding Council for England. Communication was between HEFCE and Departmental civil servants.
- Sir Brian Fender accepts that there was not quite enough challenge about the basic assumptions, i.e. about the way of taking UKeU forward and the probability of success.
- Because Funding Councils do not normally manage initiatives directly the unusual UKeU management structure was established as an organizational buffer for HEFCE. Despite this buffer Sir Brian Fender became Chair of the UKeU holding company for a period whilst still being Chief Executive of HEFCE … on reflection he accepts this 2-3 month overlap of roles reduced the buffer between HEFCE and UKeU.
- Sir Brian contends UKeU faced four challenges, apparently, all were underestimated.
- First existing platforms were not considered up to the job. Existing platforms, like Blackboard and WebCT were perceived as primarily campus-oriented products and … I applaud this … one goal was the ” … incorporation of material outside that which is available to the normal teaching and learning coordinates”.
- Second, moving the culture of learning and teaching to a point where it could exploit new opportunities offered by digital technologies (Eds. note: Didn't Sun assert that UK HE has already made this leap?).
- Third, understanding overseas markets and establishing relationships with other higher education bodies with different cultural traditions.
- Fourth, attracting the private sector.
- Sir Brain contends that signfiicant progress was made with the first three challenges.
- As to the fourth, there was an inherent conflict in the concept of attracting venture capitalists or other investors who want a high degree of control and, if necessary, framgmentation of 'products' into a venture where UK universities would certainly not relinquish control or desire fragmentation. Put simply, it is not easy to come to contractual agreements with universities who are used to being in charge of their own space. Sir Brian Fender admitted he had doubts about the wisdom of private sector involvement (which was very much government policy at that time). The UKeU structure was established on the assumption that there would be 50:50 split in public/private investment. In reality, UKeU became a public funded body and had issues relating to the viability of the business plan not taken precedence a review of UKeU structures would have had to take place anyway.
- The UKeU concept arose from within the HEFCE and only later became a political initiative.
- UKeU begain operating as if they were a private company in order to attract private investment (which never came). Meanwhile HEFCE was expecting information as if they were a body spending public money.
- Dr Adrian Lepper, Secretary to the Board of the e-Learning Holding Company, asserted that what Sun said in their presentation was not entirely accurate and he seems to challenge the concept of partnership, e.g.
“(Sun) made available to UKeU certain services and licences to be provided in the future, and for that shares were vested in a nominee company under an escrow arrangement where they could be released when these services were actually provided.”
So what are we to make of all of this? Here's my sixpence/six cents worth based on my perspective from being seconded into UKeU for a year. I worked with the Learning Systems team.
I'm not going to bore people with my puny reflections on the big politics apart from to say I applaud Sir Brian Fender's vision and his apparent willingness to fall on his sword, which I hope he doesn't have to do … whatever that means at his level. For lesser mortals this usually means you disappear down the plughole never to be heard from again:)
The vision thing was fine and we should expect HEFCE to put forward such visions. The problems started when the vision thing was absorbed in to the big politics and Spending Review machinery at a pace which didn't allow for enough thought experiments and exploration of issues, likely reactions, and hard market information instead of conjecture.
To this add a touch of ideology to create ripe conditions for culture clash, e.g. private-public partnership (which apparently wasn't).
To this elevate the importance of the UKeU platform to a point where, for many observers and particpants, UKeU became 'the platform'. An unfortunate perception not helped by UKeU's earlier promotional material declaring it was developing a 'world-class' solution.
To this add attempts at platform imperialism where university partners were expected to adopt the UKeU platform, no matter their existing local infrastructures and investments. Making perfect business sense of course, but what was in operation here was a classic 'lock in' strategy … something I've waxed lyrical about in many Auricle articles.
On the platform front, it would have been much much better if UKeU had put itself in a position where it quietly worked on a new platform under a research and development umbrella instead of finding itself having to deliver a new concept under ruthless production deadlines and out-of-control expectations. Allowing the platform to apparently float to the top of UKeU activities was, to understate it, 'not wise'. Declarations about a 'world class' platform served only to raise expectations to an urealistic level and place an incredible millstone around the neck of everyone involved.
What I, and others, found particularly frustrating, was that UKeU started to build a significant team with knowledge of learning systems in Higher Education only after key decisions had already been made. As a result, any proposed changes would then have to work their way through formal processes and procedures with interfaces between at least two organizations, and sometimes others. Tearing up and starting again was just not an option although, IMHO, and in the opinion of some others, it sometimes felt that it might have been better to do so. From a platform development perspective, what was required was a highly responsive commando team of developers and a small cadre of analysts whose first allegiance was to the UK HE community mediated through UKeU or whatever … note, not an army … a commando team. I was privileged to work with some very bright motivated people in UKeU but, for some of us, it became apparent that the 'die was already cast' and far too much had come to depend on a platform that would have gained from a much lower public profile, along with an extensive root and branch review of where we were going with it. But, by this time, the platform had developed an unstopable political imperative which in turn fed the IT press stories of delays, problems, escalating costs. It would have been so much nicer to have been able to offer the community something far more modest which could evolve instead of finding ourselves in yet another 'big bang' IT project.
Which brings me to my final points. What keeps being asserted and hinted at by those who have given evidence to the Select Committee is the incredible unrealized value of the UKeU platform, i.e. “If only there had been a bit more time and money”. Now I know we are all looking for something to salvage from the UKeU experience, but let me now sound a note of extreme caution … Eeyore's at it again 🙂
Conceptually, the UKeU platform had some sensible and, at the time, novel concepts with, arguably, the strongest being that it attempted to deliver functionality and content (a learning object by UKeU definition) in the context of the part of the programme/module a user was at the time. For example, students didn't have to go off to another part of the learning environment just to access an online discussion specific to the part of the course they were at. Moodle, and probably other enviroments, of course, now do this
I believe that there are still a few concepts within the UKeU platform which are probably worth abstracting and using elsewhere. I also believe that uncoupling some of the proprietary dependencies within the platform, e.g. on the Vignette Content Management System are significant obstacles, although Sun Microsystems may have quietly gone on to do this. But do I believe yet more public money or effort should go on seeking salvation through child of the UKeU platform? Absolutely not.
Note I say through public money or effort. Sun Microsystems apparently claim the majority of the intellectual property over the platform and are in 'discussions' with the HEFCE on how to take this forward. Even if Sun was to offer a Java like 'free' license, or even a full open source license, I now think that all the child of UKeU platform would become is an unwelcome distraction which will consume evaluation and development effort now better spent elsewhere. But reputations are at stake here and it may be kind of difficult for some of the stakeholders to quietly fade into the background, so here's a challenge:
If the UKeU platform is so good, although no private company has chosen to buy it, before HEFCE comes to any agreement with Sun Microsystems et al, why not offer the platform to the UK HE community for independent review, with review members selected not by Sun or HEFCE but by the community? Also, publish all internal and external reports on the UKeU platform, including those from UK Universities who have actually used it as well as internal reports from within UKeU. A glowing independent report is all that is necessary, reputations would be saved and the community would feel less hard done by. After all that has happened, private arrangements between Sun and HEFCE are certainly the last thing we want.
It would be the ultimate irony in an already sorry saga if attempts to resurrect the GBP 14 million UKeU platform, even under a banner of offering it 'free' to the community, ends up being the final folly.
Finallly, lest it be forgotten, many fine people joined UKeU from relatively secure posts elsewhere or were appointed to UKeU project posts within UK Universities. They bought into the vision, they gave it their best shot and they certainly didn't get any bonuses when it all turned to dust. Instead, they joined the ranks of the unemployed or found themselves in different jobs with far less security and remuneration. They, I am sure, would have added another dimension to the deliberations of the Select Committee, but from them we will hear nothing.
Case study and policy wonks may find the Uncorrected Evidence and Sun Microsystems memorandum of interest.
The computing press are, to say the least, hostile but if you like more polemic you can visit some of the links below:
http://www.pcw.co.uk/news/1159479
http://www.whatpc.co.uk/analysis/1160641
http://www.whatpc.co.uk/news/1160644
