And so the House of Commons Education and Skills Committee report into UKeU deals the final death blow to a wasted opportunity. We're left with a sense of 'snouts in the trough' and a flawed attempt to build a better mousetrap for mice who didn't exist. The leadership at all levels was apparently flawed but, speaking as one who 'was there', there was some really excellent people working in, and with, UKeU but, unfortunately, their voices were never heard by the Committee … pity that. In the Background to the UKeU section we find
33. We consider that for either the private sector or the public sector the bonuses paid to senior staff were wholly unacceptable and morally indefensible. The argument that they reflect private sector practice does not stand up to scrutiny. Any company which paid bonuses of this kind having underperformed in the way that UKeU did would face severe criticism from its shareholders. The non-executive directors who approved these bonuses through the Remuneration Committee cannot escape criticism.
{Auricle comment: An absolute disgrace. Perhaps those who received such bonuses now feel moved to give them back or suddenly find that they want to donate them to a charitable cause? }
In the Why the UKeU Failed section we find:
43. We have found that UKeU inherited a narrowly focussed definition of e-learning and chose to pursue that approach without questioning it at any stage. It did not focus on research and development concerning the definition of e-learning, and it did not have a 'learner-centred' approach.
{Auricle comment: The enquiry would have benefited mightily from talking to those below the level of senior UKeU management. They only scratched the surface. There was a lot of people within UKeU and partner universities who well understood learner centredness … but of course you've got to have some learners to be learner centred as well as a physical and virtual environment designed to facilitate it:) }
60. … UKeU allowed the development of the technology platform to drive its strategy and the development of programmes. It had a skewed focus on the platform, based on an assumption that once this was right, the original projections of very high student numbers would be easy to realise. Unfortunately this assumption was not based on research evidence, but on an over-confident presumption about the scale of the demand for wholly internet based e-learning.
{Auricle comment: Yup! … right on the nail. As I have indicated in earlier Auricle articles on this theme, UKeU should have quietly got on with this in a much lower key way, rather than allowing what was in effect a 'work-in-progress' to become, de facto, a key part of its marketing.}
65. … it appears to us that the wave of enthusiasm which caused all but a handful of higher education institutions to sign up to the UKeU project receded very rapidly, leaving it without private sector investment or active higher education sector engagement.
{Auricle comment: Yes, got to agree with this as well. Pressurizing HEIs to adopt the immature UKeU platform also didn't help … some HEIs, to their credit, successfully resisted this pressure, but it was a close run thing … a few weeks more and ?}
In Lessons for Government we find:
75. An example of the distance between the operations of UKeU, and the accounting officer is that HEFCE were unaware of the bonus scheme in place for senior management at UKeU. In 2002-03, John Beaumont's basic salary was �180,000 and he received a performance-related bonus of �44,914. It appears that the criteria for achieving the bonus were not particularly stringent. In March 2003 the technology platform was running a year late and no courses had been launched�the initial pilots that had been due to be launched in Spring 2003 were delayed until Autumn 2003. HEFCE told us that they were surprised when they found out about the bonus scheme
{Auricle comment: Yes. HEFCE/DfES should have been breathing down UKeU's neck but instead we had an organization behaving like a private company but funded by our taxes. Worse UKeU wasn't particularly concerned about the HEFCE review, … the result must have really surprised them.}
82. An important lesson to be learnt is that senior management should have had either very clear accountability for the expenditure of public money, or risk from market pressures to succeed through private investment in the project. A high risk venture such as this does not necessitate a high risk approach to structure and accountability.
{Auricle comment: Right on the nail again}
112. We do not want the Government to become increasingly risk-averse as a result of the UKeU experience. Instead it should learn from this experience and, in the future, take a more experimental approach to such high risk ventures. This would involve focussing more on testing various models and prototypes; taking an evidence-based approach; involving the private sector as partners in a more organic process; undertaking effective risk-assessment procedures; and setting open and transparent success criteria for such projects.
{Auricle comment: see my comments about 60. What does 'involve the private sector as partners in a more organic process' translate into?}
In the Future for e-learning section the report states:
117 … The Government, through HEFCE, must deliver on its commitment to outline its strategy, and action plan for its implementation, for embedding e-learning in HE in a full and sustainable way.
126. The Government, through HEFCE, should state as soon as possible how it intends to invest the residual �12 million funds remaining from the e-University project in order to meet its commitment 'to embed e-learning in a full and sustainable way' over the next 10 years. In doing so, it should keep in mind the importance of collaborative projects across the FE and HE sectors
128. The value of the platform itself is largely vested in the ownership of the intellectual property rights (IPRs). The IPRs regime for the platform is complex, with some elements owned by Sun Microsystems Ltd, some owned by UKeU, and some owned jointly. Neither HEFCE nor HoldCo could exercise any control over the IPRs. HEFCE is in negotiation with Sun with regard to the ownership of IPRs to try and ensure that the HE sector may benefit from an asset which might become exploitable in future.
{Auricle Comment: see 75. For heaven's sake! … Let's not waste any more time and money trying to resurrect some notional value from the UKeU platform. It's now tainted, and it will always be tainted. By hinting at unrealized value to save reputations all that this is doing is diverting us from getting on with more important things. The UKeU plaform has consumed enough of all our energies. But if Sun Microsystems or HEFCE insist on doing so then see my previous Auricle article on this topic, i.e. put it up for external evaluation and let's see how long it stands up to scrutiny.}
131. �14.5 million of public funds was invested in the development of the UKeU technology platform. At present it is not clear how much of this investment can be recovered, or to what use the platform can be put. Whilst is too early to determine the future value of the platform, it is important that the returns should be maximised and that they should be invested back into e-learning.
{Auricle comment: see comment about 128. Please HEFCE! no more UKeU platform.}
144. … we conclude that the Government's role in providing an overarching national strategy for e-learning is vital to ensure consistency, coherence, and clarity of purpose in developments across the sector.
{Auricle comment: As long as this doesn't translate into a VLE monoculture which may well be consistent and coherent, but at a terrible terrrible cost in the long term}.
If you want to see what the BBC has to say then visit
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/4311791.stm
